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The Concept of the Judicial
Decision
Joel Levin*
The judicial decision serves a primary role in the Anglo-American legal system.
The judicial decision performs numerous functions including that of precedent for
future cases. This Article examines three related aspects of the judicial decisiort
First, the author discusses the use of reasons in judicial decisions and concludes that
interpretation of a judicial decision requires one to develop an understanding of one's
judicial view. Second, this Article analyzes the role of legalforms. Finally, reason-
ing by analogy is examined The author maintains that the latter is not dferent
from reasoning by induction and that true nondeductive reasoning should be called
argument by metaphor.
INTRODUCTION
THE CENTRAL CONCEPT in the common law is the judicial
decision. Analyzing past decisions and framing arguments for
future decisions together serve as the focus for legal argument.
Given the importance of judicial decisions, it is hardly surprising
that there is controversy over the proper technique for under-
standing adjudication. However, the nature of the controversy is
masked. The assumption that a universally accepted proper or
canonical way to analyze decisions exists has led to confusion over
where the real controversy lies. Some precision in the use of legal
terms is essential, as is an understanding that not just bad tech-
nique but a difference in one's legal theory causes disagreement,
This does not simply mean that people disagree on the outcome of
decisions, but that differences in belief about what are the impor-
tant aspects of adjudication lead to different approaches to decid-
ing any case.
The structure of the common law finds its two-sided focus in
the judicial decision. Looking back, the decision is authority for a
set of conclusions reached by or attributed to a previous court.
* Lecturer in Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A., Univer-
sity of Chicago (1972); M.A., University of Chicago (1973); J.D., Boston University (1976);
D. Phil., University of Oxford (1981). The author wishes to thank John Finnis for his
invaluable suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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The rule in Shelley's Case,' the holding of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. ,2 and the Erie doctrine 3 are familiar examples of the
authority of a past decision. This authority is complex as it is not
only often difficult to locate the conclusions in the text, but contro-
versy surrounds the selection of criteria for location. Should a
case have one or a number of conclusions? What happens when
the reasons given do not support the stated conclusion? How criti-
cal are the facts of the case in limiting the authority or preceden-
tial value of the case? In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,4 the
Supreme Court overruled Swift v. Tyson 5 and stated that the Swift
Court had wrongly declared that a general federal common law
existed for diversity purposes. As Swif? only discussed negotiable
instruments law, did the fact that subsequent decisions read it
more broadly change the holding of Swift?6 Are its commercial
paper facts incidental or central?
Of course, decisions do not possess the same authority as stat-
utes or custom. Decisions can be wrong-the reasons given might
:iot support the conclusions reached, they might misstate or mis-
use the facts, the reasons themselves might be inappropriate or
unsound, or there might be one of a hundred other possible flaws
in reasoning. Therefore, the authority is based both on the fact of
the decision and on its being well-reasoned.
The forward centrality of the judicial decision comes from its
form. Common law lawyers structure all further questions into
the hypothetical judicial case form but it could be otherwise. One
might ask, for any particular aspect of the common law, how the
case form affects the behavior of those governed by it or the offi-
cials who apply the legal rules. Practitioners, however, dissect
other forms of legal authority (statutes, constitutions, custom),
take reasons, and reassemble a new argument for use as a reason
in a judicial decision. This technique or process has well-defined
strictures. For instance, only certain forms of authority count.
Weighing the reasons is more controversial because measuring the
reasons and policies of past decisions against statutes or one an-
other is not just a matter of technical expertise. It is also a matter
1. 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (1581).
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. Id.
5. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
6. See, eg., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Black & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Salem Trust Co. v. Manu-
facturers' Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924); Oakes v. Mase, 165 U.S. 363 (1897).
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of stating what is important in the general way one reaches or
should reach decisions.
This Article serves as an introduction to these concerns. By
analyzing the structure of reasoning within judicial decisions, it
provides a picture, albeit a somewhat sketchy one, of one central
concept of the common law. This Article examines only the logic
of judicial decisions as precedent. Decisions serve a number of
other functions, including providing a record for inspection and
appeal and allowing a judge an opportunity to state reasons to
justify his conclusions. More fundamentally, the decision allows
for the resolution of disputes. As a result, decisions must be in a
form suitable to resolve disputes. In this sense, a decision is more
than a mere assertion of ordinary speech, it is also performance, a
speech act.7 If a judge states: "You are now divorced," "Adop-
tion granted," "Guilty," or "There is no valid contract," he can-
not, in this one sense, be right or wrong. His statement, like a
clergyman's pronouncement of wedlock, makes it so. It is this an-
swer-providing function, which awards or denies a suitor relief,
that this Article will set aside.
Judicial theory also needs to be set aside, but only in part.
Theoretical problems of identifying what counts as a decision or
precedent and why decisions should count at all, involve difficult
areas of individuation, identity, and balancing. Some legal sys-
tems, including the civil law,8 early English equity9 and the origi-
nal Court of Common Pleas,"° have given past judicial decisions
little weight. In the common law, identifying the criteria for se-
lecting a case to carry a certain authority is complex and contro-
versial. Some kind of judicial theory is necessary to sift the
myriad of putative authority and to create an ordering among se-
lected contenders. If theory construction is beyond the scope of
this Article, the demonstration of the place of such theory is not.
Judicial theory is the body of principles that determines whether a
decision is rightly decided. As this Article will discuss later, this
theory, at least in embryonic form, is essential to any analysis of
the concept of the judicial decision. The minimum content of this
7. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962) for an analy-
sis of the nature of different functions of speech. For a fuller, more recent treatment, see
also J.R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969).
8. For a general, if oversimplified, description of this system, see J.H. MERRYMAN,
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 24, 35-39, 48, 50-58, 87-91 (1969).
9. Legal scholars do not agree that early equity greatly differed from the common
law in its use of precedent. See, e.g., F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 8, 93-94 (2d ed. 1936).
10. See F. WEST, THE JUSTICIARSHIP IN ENGLAND (1966).
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theory must include a judicial view, a set of beliefs and attitudes
about the proper criteria for deciding cases.
This Article discusses three related aspects of the concept of
the judicial decision. The first section analyzes the use of rea-
sons.II A part of the disagreement about what a judgment within
a decision "means," "holds," or "stands for" sometimes is not re-
ally a disagreement but a confusion. For example, a judge's given
reasons need not imply his stated conclusions. If one person
claims the decision stands for what the stated reasons imply and
another maintains that it stands for what the conclusion states, a
confusion is the basis of their disagreement. To suppose that a
factual disagreement exists within the case, as practitioners may
often suppose, would conflate distinct matters unknowingly. The
difference lies with conflicting beliefs about how adjudication
should work. Eliminating confusion over terms allows for clarity
about the dimensions of the real (normative) disagreement.
The second section looks at the sources of authority in adjudi-
cation, legal forms. 2 These forms operate ambiguously in the de-
cision. Once the ambiguity is clarified, there is a further problem:
discovering the meaning of the forms. Some resort to intentional-
ity is necessary.
The third section looks briefly at reasoning by analogy.'3 Like
"the reason of the case" and the legal form, practitioners consider
it a straightforward tool of adjudication. After the clarification of
certain features of reasons and forms, legal reasoning by analogy
collapses.
I. REASONS AND CONCLUSIONS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS
There is vast literature which purports to explain how to read,
understand, and use judicial decisions.' 4 Much of it centers on
what a holding of a decision entails and how one distinguishes the
holding, sometimes in common law called the ratio decidendi,
from other conclusions, obiter dicta.'5 As decisions are authority
11. See infra notes 14-45 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 46-70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 71-101 and accompanying text.
14. Although this literature is of little significance here, see, e.g., C.K. ALLEN, LAW IN
THE MAKING (7th ed. 1964); B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921);
R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1977); H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS 1-206, 367-668 (1958); E. LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
(1948); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960);
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930).
15. This distinction between the ratio and the obiter was once at the heart ofjurispru-
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and arguments from past decisions are arguments from authority
(the doctrine of precedent), it is important to understand where
the authority is strong (in the form of the ratio decidendi) and
where it is weak (in the form of obiter dicta).6 An often ignored
prior question involves asking in what way a decision serves as an
authority. In order to examine this question, several distinctions
must be made.
A. Conclusions Stated and Conclusions Implied
The first distinction is between the actual conclusions stated in
the decision and the conclusion one can imply from the reasons
stated in the opinion. The reasons in the opinion may imply one
of five possible things: the conclusion the opinion actually states;
a different conclusion, either contrary or contradictory; the con-
clusion or another conclusion with both being satisfactory (the
disjunct here being inclusive); either the conclusion or another
conclusion with only one conclusion being satisfactory (the dis-
junct here being exclusive); or no conclusion. One cannot expect
the strict logical implication of the\kind found in mathematical
statements. The reasons for a certain and widespread imprecision
are well-known; judicial reasons often employ vague and ambigu-
ous language, judicial intention is often uncertain, and opinions
leave unstated many premises in the reasoning chain. However,
the reasons a judge offers in his opinions are not meant to be im-
plied strictly. They are premises in judicial argument and such an
argument is employed within a socially shared tradition. Given
that tradition and its concomitant common discourse, one can
speak of implication of reasons within actual decisions.
dential discussion, but is now largely out of favor. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAM-
BLE BUSH 36-47 (3d ed. 1960), for a discussion of this distinction. If the categories seem
slightly archaic, the idea behind them is still vital. The idea concerns how one understands
a case and decides what is critical and what is peripheral to the judgment. The categories
are useful as a quick way to enter into discussion of a case without setting up a possibly
safer, but certainly more cumbersome system.
16. The authority of judicial decisions is a dominant common law notion. It is weaker
in civil law and many commentators argue that cases do not serve as authority in civil law
jurisdictions. Typical is the comment of John Henry Merryman: "[T]he accepted theory of
sources of law in the civil law tradition recognizes only statute, regulations, and custom as
sources of law. This listing is exclusive." J. H. MERRYMAN, supra note 8, at 25. However,
as Merryman points out later, "[t]he civil law is a law of the professors." Id. at 60. These
professors often draft the statutes and write the texts which control interpretation. An ex-
amination of past decisions is a large part of professorial scholarship. Thus, even here, the
judicial case has some importance as authority, although somewhat removed. Of course,
the fact that constitutions allow for judicial review of certain cases in some civil law juris-
dictions further erodes the idea of the legislature as the sole source of authority.
[Vol. 33:208
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Judges presumably include reasons in opinions because they
believe that, taken as a set, they imply the stated conclusions. Al-
though this is certainly sometimes the case, often it is not. If the
judge makes a mistake-such as where he states: "ifp, q, r, and s,
then t" andp, q, r, and s implies either not t or more specifically,
u-the two will vary and a wrong determination results. More
commonly, an underdetermination or overdetermination can oc-
cur. Underdetermination occurs when reasons run out; for exam-
ple, when "ifp, q, r, and s, then t" is true, but the judge assumed
"ifp, q, and s, then t." Overdetermination occurs when both "if
p, q, r, and s, then t" and "if m, n, o, andp, then t" are true and
the judge uses both of these statements to reach his conclusion---.
One should not assume that a disparity between reasons and
conclusions is necessarily due to fuzzy thinking. It can be person-
ally advantageous for the judge to mask his indecision or uncer-
tainty. In a more basic sense, it can be institutionally
advantageous for courts generally to settle disputes in individual
cases while not heightening or highlighting the kind of disparity of
views that often gives rise to entire dockets of disputes. In that a
certain obfuscation is encouraged, ambiguity is sure to follow.
Some commentators dispute the existence of this distinction
because they see an integrated decision with reasons leading to the
stated conclusion. For example, Professor Rupert Cross stated,
"The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or im-
plicitly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his
conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him,
or a necessary part of his direction to the jury."17
Rather than assuming that reasons and conclusions coincide,
i.e., each implies the same proposition or set of propositions to
produce the ratio, it is more accurate to say (if one wants to retain
17. R. CRoss, supra note 14, at 76. Cross does qualify this by noting: "The adoption
of one line of reasoning by the judge is not incompatible with his adopting a further line of
reasoning. Allowance must be made for the fact that a case may have more than one ratio
decidendi." Id. at 76 n.3. What Cross means by more than one ratio still involves lines of
reasoning tied to judgment; he merely allows that there may be either more than one judg-
ment or two parallel lines that are compatible and lead to the judgment. Id. at 54-59,
86-89. He does not recognize a separation between the stated reasons and the stated judg-
ment.
In Cross' defense, he claims to describe the general usage of "ratio" by lawyers rather
than the correct usage. Id. at 76-78. Later he wavers in that restriction and seems uncer-
tain about whether his work is a description of certain social data or a recommendation for
the use of the data as a basis for improvement. For example, he tells the reader when and
to what extent a ratio is binding, presumably using the lawyer's description of that term,
but treats the subject as if the ambiguities and difficulties did not exist. Id. at 90-101.
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the idea of a ratio) there are two sets of rationes in every case.
The reasons stated in the opinion produce the first ratio and the
opinion's conclusion yields the second. 8 Sometimes the two ra-
tiones coincide (they each imply the other), but even then, one can
individuate the two and each can serve as a check on the other.
B. Decisional Reasons as Reasons and Authority
A second and more important distinction exists between deci-
sional reasons as reasons and decisional reasons as authority.
Each decision contains one or more arguments for the conclusion
or conclusions it reaches. Reasons figure as premises in those ar-
guments. In order to put forth a judicial argument, the judge must
consider his audience. He assumes a large body of shared knowl-
edge in any case and the scope of that assumption varies depend-
ing on ordinary things such as whether the case is one of first
instance or an appeal, whether he is sitting alone or en banc,
whether the type of case is commonplace or esoteric, and whether
the situation is straightforward or complicated. In order to ad-
vance an argument, it may be just as necessary to employ tradi-
tional legal propositions as it is to employ propositions of fact,
logic, ethics, or politics.
However, practitioners reasons in judicial decisions are taken
as authority for future cases.' 9 Especially susceptible to this prac-
tice are reasons which one can restate as normative propositions.
The difficulty arises when one decides to criticize judgment. It is a
necessary but often neglected aspect of analysis to decide whether
reasons are suspect as logical premises or as authority. For exam-
ple, in Riggs v. Palmer20 a legatee murdered his testator but never-
theless sought to enjoy the benefits of the testator's will. One of
the court's reasons for its decision denying the legatee recovery
was that no man ought to benefit from his own wrong. 21 One
could criticize that reason as being faulty authority. It is vague, it
says more than is necessary to reach a conclusion to the case (it is
overbroad), and it has a suspicious pedigree (nowhere does the
decision clearly state where one could find the reason in previous
case law or statutes).- In fact, the results of other cases contradict
18. This division is apart from any other propagation method for a ratio, i.e., several
issues or several judgments. It is a necessary rather than a contingent division.
19. Although this applies to the common law tradition, evidence exists that it also
applies to some extent in civil law. See supra note 16.
20. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
21. Id. at 511-15, 22 N.E. at 190-91.
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this reason. For example, when an intentional contract breacher
violates a contract where there is no benefit to the bargain,2 2 the
breacher is in a position to benefit from his or her wrong. The "no
benefit from wrongdoing" reason could be attacked logically as
well. It might not be thought to lead to the conclusion, but merely
duplicate it in a more general form. That is, given the counter-
reason that disposal of the estate should be in accordance with the
testator's written instructions, a statement concerning a reluctance
to reward wrongs in the courtroom is of uncertain relevance.
Does the reason go toward a reevaluation of the testator's actual
or probable intention if he knew about his imminent poisoning?
Does it establish a rule that overrides other rules and if so, when?
Both criticisms are valid. However, if one rejected the propo-
sition that "no man shall benefit from his own wrong" as author-
ity because the argument contains faulty logic, one would commit
an error. One commits a complementary error by rejecting the
reason as logically invalid merely because it has a suspicious ori-
gin. A statement may carry authority regardless of errors of rea-
soning, just as one may employ a groundless argument in support
of a correct and valid conclusion.
C. Issues Raised Versus Issues Addressed
A third distinction and one that generates controversy where
controversy does not seem possible, is the distinction between the
actual questions raised by the case and the questions stated and
addressed in the opinion. Fact situations can produce a complex
and initially bewildering number of issues. Judges often address
them in the manner suggested by the advocate presenting the case.
Appellate courts usually discuss only those issues raised on ap-
peal. At times, courts neglect, overlook, or misunderstand is-
sues.' The more common occurrence is that perceptions of what
is important within a controversy change. Even a slight move-
ment in separating the questions actually addressed from the
questions theoretically possible can have dramatic consequences.
The shift in products liability cases from the "inherently danger-
ous rule" to products merely "dangerous" well illustrates this
22. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 707 (1960).
23. Cases examining whether a sum of money serves as good consideration for a
promise to pay a greatly larger sum exemplify all of these possibilities. These cases virtu-
ally never discuss the issue of usury. See, e.g., In re Green, 45 F.2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1930);
American Univ. v. Todd, 1 A.2d 595 (Del. Super. Ct. 1938); Schnell v. Neil, 17 Ind. 29
(1861); Shepard v. Rhodes, 7 R.I. 470 (1863).
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principle.24 Thomas v. Winchester25 involved a case of mislabeled
poison sold to a remote vendee. The issue for the court was
whether the remote vendor's action put life in "imminent danger,"
the test under relevant precedent. 26 A subsequent decision, Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co. ,27 allowed recovery in a similar case
which involved a defective automobile. In MacPherson, the court
looked back at Thomas v. Winchester and found in the latter case
the foundations of general liability for all defective articles. The
court simply looked at Thomas as raising a general issue never
considered by the original court.
When one states that a case stands for a certain proposition,
one must carefully separate the proposition intended by those de-
ciding the case from what other readers, beginning with the facts
and ending with the conclusion, may reason that it stands for.
This difference between the opinion of the decision's author and
practitioners' possible, later impressions, is also relevant to the
fourth distinction-that between judicial intention toward the
case and other later parties' intentions.
D. The Deciding Judge's View of the Case Versus the Opinion of
Later Observers
Karl Llewellyn put forth the above difference as the "distinc-
tion between the ratio decidendi, the court's own version of the
rule of the case and the true rule of the case, to wit what it will be
made to standfor by another later court.' '28 One can restate Llew-
ellyn's distinction in general terms and distinguish between the
deciding judge's view of the case and later observers' assessment
24. See E. LEvI, supra note 14, at 8-27.
25. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
26. See, e.g., Dixon v. Bell, 5 Maule & Selwyn 198, 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (1816). But
see Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Meeson & Welsby 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
27. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
28. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 15, at 52. Llewellyn continues by saying that
[o]ne of the vital elements of our doctrine of precedent is this: that any later court
can always reexamine a prior case, and under the principle that the court could
decide only what was before it, and that the older case must now be read with that
in view, can arrive at the conclusion that the dispute before the earlier court was
much narrower than that court thought it was, called therefore for the application
of a much narrower rule. Indeed, the argument goes further. It goes on to state
that no broader rule could have been laid down excathedra, because to do that
would have transcended the powers of the earlier court.
Id. Llewellyn does not fully accept the third distinction. He fails to see that a subsequent
reading of a case can broaden as well as narrow the conclusions. This process occurs rou-
tinely in constitutional law cases and generally takes place when there is an attempt to
eliminate an overcrowded classification.
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of the judgment. A difference can arise when just interpreting a
previous decision involves deviations from the original intention
of its authors. This occurs when a decision is of ancient or alien
origin (borrowed from another or predecessor legal system) or
when one tries to fit a troublesome decision into an otherwise tidy
line of past cases. Interpretation can also range wider afield and
wide discrepancies may occur when a later court or observer fas-
tens onto an earlier decision's ambiguity or vagueness and pro-
ceeds to gloss or rereason the previous case.29
A. W. B. Simpson contests this distinction. He speaks in terms
of the ratio decidendi,30 but one can generalize his position.
Simpson states:
The reductio ad absurdum of this confusion is to be found ex-
pressed in the theory that the ratio decidendi of a case is a rule
which is constructed by a later court when called upon to con-
sider the case. To defne the ratio in this way is surely per-
verse-if it were correct to do so a number of oddities would
follow. For example it would be a contradiction to say that a
court had misunderstood an earlier case's ratio, for by defini-
tion this could not be so; it could neither be understood nor
misunderstood; confronted with two variant judicial decisions
as to the ratio of an earlier case one would have to say that the
case had two different rationes decidendi; analyses of cases
which had not yet been considered by a court would have to be
portrayed as prophecies as to what in the future would be the
ratio decidendi of a case already decided.3
Given the divergent use of "ratio," Simpson might want to of-
fer his own definition of the term. He could also argue, as Cross
does in places,32 that the accepted usage of the phrase "ratio
decidendi" lies in the original court's expression of its intended
interpretation. Instead Simpson uses a logical argument that sug-
gests that the point discussed above is untenable because the idea
of a later construction of the ratio is not logically viable. He uses
three arguments to support this idea, none of which is
satisfactory.33
First, he suggests that allowing a later interpretation of a case's
29. Perhaps Glanville Williams had this phenomenon in mind when he said that the
phrase "ratio decidendi" is slightly ambiguous. See G. WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 80
(8th ed. 1969).
30. A. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi ofa Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent,
in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 148 (A. Guest ed. 1961).
31. Id. at 169.
32. R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 35-101 (2d ed. 1961).
33. A. Simpson, supra note 30, at 169.
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ratio prevents practitioners from asserting that a court misunder-
stood an earlier court's ratio.34 If this were true, one could only
echo Simpson35 and state that it is odd. It is not incoherent and,
in fact, one can see advantages to such an approach. Where
neither the decision's stated reasons nor the court's actions imply
the earlier decision's stated conclusions, one can simply disregard
the inconsistent and usually irrational conclusion. However,
Simpson's objection fails for another reason. One can recognize
parallel types of approaches to case analysis as useful and use
them without a commitment to any single approach. Even if one
is committed to the approach of later construction, one can speak
of wrongly interpreting an earlier ratio. Strictly speaking, this
would not constitute an assertion of an incorrect ratio but a state-
ment that the court reached an incorrect conclusion, but this is a
small matter of terminology. In any case, the type of analysis and
criticism under Simpson's preferred approach would still be
available.
Simpson's second argument maintains that if later cases inter-
pret an earlier case differently, one is placed in the unhappy posi-
tion of having to say that the earlier case has two or more rationes
decidendi.36 This, however, confuses conditions for asserting a
propositon with conditions for that proposition's being true. Sup-
pose two later courts seek to discover whether a previous deci-
sion's conclusions are justified. That they may disagree on the
answer does not suggest that either is without grounds for its as-
sertions. If both later courts have authority to declare judgment,
then presumably there is some method for deciding which of the
cases' judgments is superior. As for whether the original conclu-
sion was justifiable, anyone who analyzes it is equally able (if not
equally competent) to comment upon this question. Disagree-
ment does not indicate that subsequent analysis is impossible.
One can make the same argument for the ratio. That courts may
disagree about where to locate it does not suggest that any contra-
diction need arise. If the original decision is a social fact to be
observed, then one can settle the subsequent disagreement about
its ratio decidendi in the same way as one settles any dispute.
Simpson's third argument is that, until a decision is reexam-
ined, if a ratio is subsequently constructed, then one can only pre-
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
Vol. 33:208
CONCEPT OF THE JUDICIAL DECISION
dict its holding.37 This is exactly what occurs as a normal aspect
of the concept of precedent anyway. When one looks to judicial
decisions (or statutes for that matter), their application in subse-
quent cases is a matter of concern. Some normative standard may
exist which will tell what the answer ought to be and such a stan-
dard may serve as the controlling element in a prediction. If
judges use standards, one cannot only predict the holding but one
can predict it with some confidence. Stating that a method em-
ploys prediction is not a criticism if the expectations of persons
interested in court opinions focus upon prediction and the con-
struction of a method which allows success in predicting future
court judgments is possible at least in theory.
E. Style and Ordering in Judicial Decisions
The final distinction drawn is between a canonical or formula-
bound way of presenting reasons and the judge's peculiar and in-
dividual method of presentation. Legal scholars have always rec-
ognized style as an important component in a case and the
American Realists often pointed to schools of style and their ef-
fects on a decision's presentation.38 If given a set of facts and a set
of competing arguments, one might devise an analogue for order-
ing facts and arguments in such a way to reach a determination.
If one were then to criticize an individual's or judge's ordering,
one could have a standard by which to measure it. Suppose that
use of this analogue depended upon information that was occa-
sionally missng. In addition, suppose that one could find the
method for attaining this information, whether missing or incom-
plete, in the ordering that the analogue meant to criticize. Then
any criticism leveled at a judge's treatment would be suspect, for
37. Id.
38. For example, Karl Llewellyn saw the development of Anglo-American common
law as a battle between two types of judicial style. The "Grand Style" allowed for growth
through the incorporation of new concepts into lines of precedent. The "Formal Style"
allowed for a system of increasing internal consistency at the expense of adequately shap-
ing decisions for solving societal problems. Llewellyn recognized both styles as equally
legitimate vis-a-vis the law, but criticized the Formal Style as socially and politically inade-
quate, intellectually moribund, and aesthetically cumbersome and inelegant. In this sense,
he embraces the judicial pluralism position. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 62-120.
Llewellyn uses the term "style" not merely to refer to "literary quality or tone, but to the
manner of doing the job, to the way of craftsmanship in office, to a functioning harmoniza-
tion of vision with tradition, of continuity with growth, of machinery with purpose, of
measure with need." Id. at 37. While this description is a bit overblown for our purposes,
style does denote a personal approach to cases as well as a literary tone.
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the criteria that produced the analogue are themselves a function
of criticism of the case. An illustration will clarify this point.
Suppose that D and P are adjoining landowners. D is a plant
biologist who performs regular and extensive experiments on his
property. He has devised a spray that, when applied regularly,
causes regular grass to mutate into a giant, woody, fast-growing,
pungent, and high-in-protein cereal. Because of the prevailing
wind and the fact that P took down a high fence that once sepa-
rated their properties, P's yard has become a cereal jungle. P is
unhappy and therefore sues D. The judge, sitting in an American
jurisdiction, holds for D. He reasons that D's work is socially use-
ful,39 that P could have taken steps to prevent the growth by sim-
ply not removing the fence,4" and that P came to the property
knowing of D's operations.4a
An observer of this hypothetical case would note that the
judge treated the matter as a private nuisance. While examining
the case's main proposition, this observer would note at least two
facts. First, the reasoning of the judge is ambiguous. The reader
does not know whether each of the stated reasons alone mandates
a holding against P or whether all are necessary to the decision.
The reasons themselves are closely tied to certain facts and how
general the reasons are (that is, how many fact situations they
cover) is not known. Under the court's opinion, given a replica of
P v. D, D wins. But given cases like P v. D, we cannot say how P
or D might do. Second, an alternate basis of liability might ex-
ist-that of trespass.42 We do not know from the actual case of P
v. D whether or not the court barred trespass as a basis of liability
because the jungle growth did not constitute interference with pos-
39. Assuming that the court treats the case as one of private nuisance, one well-recog-
nized defense arises when the alleged creator of the nuisance is conducting an activity of
great social worth or value. See, e.g., Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 111-14 (1868).
40. If plaintiff can easily prevent the nuisance, his failure to do so may cut off liability.
See, e.g., Kenney & Wood Mfg. Co. v. Union Mfg. Co., 39 Conn. 576 (1873); Carroll
Springs Distilling Co. v. Schnepfe, 111 Md. 420, 74 A. 828 (1909).
41. Courts sometimes hold that "coming to the nuisance" bars liability when the pub-
lic has a major interest in the nuisance. See, e.g., East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of
Portland, 195 Or. 505, 524-25, 246 P.2d 554, 562 (1952); Powell v. Superior Portland Ce-
ment, 15 Wash. 2d 14, 19, 129 P.2d 536, 538 (1942).
42. The difference between trespass and nuisance is historically obscure, but the Re-
statement of Torts provides the current view which states that trespass is an invasion of
plaintiff's interest in the exclusive possession of the land, while nuisance is an interference
with his use and enjoyment of the land. Obviously, the two are not mutually exclusive.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 scope and introductory note (1939). See also Ryan v. City
of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 603-04, 4 N.W.2d 435, 438 (1942) (describing the historical
difference between trespass and nuisance).
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session, because the statute of limitations ran out,43 because of an-
other good reason, or because no one thought of trespass as a basis
for liability.
The style of the judge's opinion prevents us from knowing
which lines of reasoning he considered necessary and which lines
were sufficient for the holding. It also prevents a full understand-
ing of which other possible causes of action might lie in similar
cases. One might wish to criticize P v. D by claiming either that
the court should have considered trespass or that one or another
line of reasoning was irrelevant. Criticism might require an ana-
logue based in part on the holdings of past decisions.' In theory,
these past decisions are as vulnerable as P v. D to the objection
that style shaped their meaning. The analogue is uncertain to the
degree that style allows for ambiguities. There is thus a considera-
ble measure of indeterminacy of intention in evaluating decisions,
an indeterminacy that undermines any attempt to use past deci-
sions precisely to assess the validity of future decisions.
After making these five distinctions we can now say something
about the role of a case in judicial reasoning. All five distinctions
suggest that reliance on previous decisions as authority is far from
an uncomplicated matter. One's judicial view provides a method
for approaching a past decision as well as for answering questions
in a present case. However, there is a logical space between giving
judgment and understanding an already-answered case.
A judge lists reasons in his judgment, but these reasons are not
necessarily the ones that brought him to the conclusion. He may
not know or remember these and others may not have the ability
to offer a satisfactory account of his reasons. The judge does not
look at his own psychological reasons as relevant for inclusion in
his decision. Rather, he looks to reasons that are appropriate and
justify a decision. In this important sense, judicial decisions are
reconstructions. Once the judge arrives at a decision, he employs
an analogue yielded by his judicial view and reconstructs his deci-
sion on a rational basis."a The actual reasons for his decision are
43. Traditionally, an action for trespass becomes complete upon entry onto the land,
while nuisance begins when substantial harm occurs. If D had stopped spraying but the
growth continued, a difference in actions could be significant. See W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 89, at 595-96 (4th ed. 1971).
44. In this context, analogue connotes an ordered procedure for solving a problem,
e.g., a statistical method or a computer program. Analogue in the sense of "paradigm" or
"model" is not intended.
45. One should not impute duplicity to judges in this context. In their reconstruction,
judges may employ the reasons that motivated their decision or at least those that they
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outside the purview of any propositional set, as are the reasons
that consciously or unconsciously motivated his decision. The
reasons stated are evidence of his judicial view.
To understand what a judge meant by his stated reasoning,
one must have some notion of his judicial view. This will tell why
he put forth the stated reasons. But it is one's own view that deter-
mines how one assesses the meaning of judicial decisions. One
can look at the distinctions made earlier and see them as compet-
ing alternatives for inclusion within a judicial view. In this sense,
when one speaks of a case standing for some proposition or hold-
ing some position, the case is a reconstructed reconstruction, what
one might call a "rereconstruction." One's own judicial view tells
one how to read the case (whether one looks to reasons or conclu-
sions, whether one takes questions as actually raised, whether one
looks at the judge's intention as central, and how one treats the
individual style of reasoning in past cases), puts in an orderly ba-
sis the disparate elements of individual cases, and allows classifi-
cation of the variety of cases.
The distinctions discussed might also suggest methods of adju-
dication. Commitments at the level of theory govern one's ap-
proach to a case. For instance, a commitment will dictate whether
one looks to all of the reasons stated in a previous decision or just
to the stated conclusion. The same logic holds for other legal
forms-strict versus revisionary interpretations of written consti-
tutions or statutes interpreted on their face, versus statutes inter-
preted according to legislative intent as evidenced by legislative
committee records and floor debates. These are competing posi-
tions based on competing views and debate on one's choice of po-
sition is constitutive of view disparities. Of course, the various
positions only occasionally produce different results. This is gen-
erally a characteristic of judicial views. Identity of conclusions
between competing views on so many questions lull one into be-
lieving that only a single view predominates. However, if inter-
subjective agreement does not imply an objective standard,
neither should agreement between different views suggest that
only one view is operating.
II. LEGAL FORMS
Judicial decisions are central to a discussion of judicial reason-
believe motivated their decision. However, they use these reasons differently when they
employ them as justifications.
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ing. Within the context of legal systems, they are one among sev-
eral elements labeled legal forms. Individually, these forms have
their own nuances, but they share several formal features that this
Article examines. Several difficulties inherent in interpreting the
meaning of cases are common to all legal forms and have received
quicker recognition as difficulties in other forms. Both statutory
and constitutional interpretations are usually considered difficult
matters and controversy surrounds the selection of criteria for set-
tlement. As with cases, other legal forms often exhibit a certain
logic intended to persuade. They thus collapse an otherwise clear
distinction between sources that argue from authority and sources
that argue through reason. There is the difficulty in all legal forms
of deciding which concept of intention to employ.46 This determi-
nation must take into account numerous factors including who
originally generates the legal form-customs originate with no in-
dividual; cases with a certain, ascertainable individual; statutes
with a discrete corporate body of individuals with a range of com-
peting views; and constitutions with several corporate bodies,
often without a certain ascertainable membership. If intention is
a well-accepted, necessary component in any theory of meaning,47
then the construction of a concept of intention broad enough to
interpret legal forms is a general difficulty in this area.48
There is a popular picture of legal forms. Practitioners employ
forms, usually called sources of law, as authoritative reasons for
determining a certain judicial proposition. If a question arises
46. This Article employs intention here in the ordinary language sense-one's pur-
pose or meaning concerning a future act. This Article does not use the special denotation
of the term in law which at times differentiates "intention" from "motive" or "presuming
the natural consequences of one's acts." The ordinary sense is closer to the meaning dis-
cussed in philosophical literature. See, e.g., E. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (2d ed. 1963); Da-
vidson, Beliefand the Basis ofMeaning, 27 SYNTHESE 309 (1974); Davidson, Truth and
Meaning, 17 SYNTHESE 304 (1967).
47. See Peacocke, Truth Defnitions andActual Language, in TRUTH AND MEANING
162 (1976). Many commentators have tried to characterize the role of intention, but all
have had at best limited success. H.P. Grice made the most ambitious attempt and defines
the meaning of an expression in terms of the intentions of the majority of individuals who
commonly use it. He defines the meaning a particular speaker gives that expression in
terms of the effect he intends to bring about in the mind of the listener. See Grice, Utterer's
Meaning and Intentions, 78 PHIL. REy. 147 (1969); Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REv. 378
(1957).
48. For a good illustration of how a deviant model of intention illuminates a particu-
lar type of utterance or statement, see MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754
(1966),reprintedin ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 237 (R. Summers ed. 1968). MacCallum
argues that legislatures are not capable of ordinary intention. Therefore, in order to under-
stand the meaning of statutes, one needs to construct an institutional model that interprets
the workings of a corporate body when it enacts legislation.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
before a court, attorneys turn to legal forms which are (1) com-
plete or nearly complete, (2) easily selected as relevant from the
universe of possible sources, and (3) authoritative according to
some not too difficult preference ordering (e.g., if a case and a
statute conflict, choose the statute; if an earlier statute conflicts
with a final court's gloss on it, choose the case). A great deal of
debate among legal theorists centers on just how well forms fulfill
the task described above. Do they answer all questions or most?4 9
Are things such as customs, international agreements, or adminis-
trative rulings properly considered legal forms in themselves, or
do they merely figure derivatively, so that, for example, adminis-
trative rulings are authoritative only because statutes prescribe
them?5" Are judicial interpretations of constitutions subject to al-
teration by legislatures or future courts?5 Does the repeal of a
statute give life to prior case law inconsistent with that statute,
even though that case law has neither evolved nor been tempered
by other cases subsequent to the statute's enactment?52 All of
these kinds of questions assume that the popular picture is true.
That picture, however, is incomplete and depending on how one
completes it, becomes nearly accurate or quite misleading.
Practitioners introduce legal forms at two distinct steps in the
judicial reasoning process which can be called the definitional oc-
currence and the resolution occurrence. 3 The definitional occur-
rence indicates the role of legal forms in defining the judicial role.
The resolution occurrence indicates the part played by legal forms
in reaching an actual decision in a case. Legal forms are social
facts, evidence of individual or group practices, or intentions.
They contain propositions but are themselves largely documen-
tary. Occasionally, forms include unwritten but easily recognized
social, business, or religious customs. The ties between legal
49. This controversy concerns completeness and centers on when, if ever, one can look
beyond legal forms for assistance in decisionmaking. Further, if one must go beyond legal
forms, does the decision have as much authority as it would if it only employed legal
forms?
50. This question exemplifies the inclusion controversy, which focuses upon what
should be included within the set of legal forms.
51. This is an example within the ordering controversy, which centers on how one
should settle interformal disputes. See, e.g, Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735
(1949) (a practical ordering controversy that focuses on judicial interpretations of written
constitutions).
52. This second order example of an ordering controversy illustrates how the difficulty
in ordering can escalate.
53. One should not assume that individuals retain these distinctions when construct-
ing a judicial view, but only that they are logically distinguishable.
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forms and the judicial decision are so tight that it is easy to forget
that they are not a necessary but a contingent element in judicial
decisionmaking. One could imagine a system, perhaps not unlike
early English equity, where legal forms would exist as facts but
judges largely ignore them. Under such a system, the Chancellor
might claim not to be governed by central court cases, past equity
cases, custom, and certainly local regulations and pronounce-
ments.54 The intimacy of legal forms to the judicial decision also
obscures the fact that forms enter twice into the judicial equation.
The initial intrusion of legal forms comes with the definitional
occurrence. Because judges are to act as judges, their formulation
of questions takes on an altered, contextual flavor. Many of the
kinds of questions found in courtrooms are also found, perhaps in
slightly altered terminology, in other settings. Conflicts make for
judicial cases and their characterization and resolution depends
upon the type of forum resolving the conflicts. The judicial form
depends on the role of the judge. The question of what he should
do arises in every conflict that comes into court.
Formulating a concept of role involves constructing a proce-
dure for deciding cases. That is, a part of role involves making
decisions on what types of things a judge ought to use to resolve
cases. A not uncommon set of possible factors would include a
notion of justice, a notion of fairness or equity, a certain political
and social "philosophy", and loyalty or adherence to certain legal
forms. A conflict at this point between, for instance, a statute (a
legal form) and some fairness principle is not an argument about
how to resolve specific cases. It is, rather, an argument about
what things are proper considerations for judges. One might be-
lieve that judges should consider the pronouncements of legisla-
tures without being committed to any position concerning
competition between statutes and equity principles. This position
only states that a judge is not behaving as a judge if he does not
consider statutes.
Legal forms are among the competitors for inclusion in the
54. This is the common picture of early English equity. See generally Holdsworth,
The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges to the Equity Adminis-
teredby the Chancellor, 26 YALE LJ. 1 (1916) (defending this view). However, given Eng-
land's common law backdrop and the small size of its bench and bar (which allows all to
know of past cases) it seems that from an early time equity may have looked to past deci-
sions as authority de facto if not de jure. This suggests that the case is important here, as in
civil law, despite an orthodoxy that follows the contrary view. See generally C. DICKENS,
BLEAK HousE (1853) (a classic, if not notorious caricature of the narrowness and relative
smallness of the equity bench and bar).
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concept of judicial role, in that role entails a method of proceed-
ing for the judge. Here, the popular picture is misleading, as it
suggests that one turns to legal forms and more or less finds an-
swers to the issues raised in cases. In the case of the definitional
occurrence, however, one uses legal forms to determine role. The
determination involves whether to look to legal forms and decid-
ing to what extent they are the concern (or a concern) in defining
role. One has to determine the exact direct scope of forms in the
definition and then analyze the derivative part which arises upon
practical application. An example will clarify this point.
In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.," plaintiff-re-
spondent furniture company sold household items to defendant-
appellant on credit. 6 The sales and credit involved a complicated
contract whereby Walker-Thomas added each purchase price to
the general amount owed and credited pro rata each payment to-
ward paying off all past purchases. Purchases were deemed to be
leases until the customer paid all outstanding debts to the com-
pany.57 The court stated: "As a result, the debt incurred at the
time of purchase of each item was secured by the right to repossess
all the items previously purchased by the same purchaser, and
each new item purchased automatically became subject to a secur-
ity interest arising out of the previous dealings."58 Five years after
initiating the contract relationship, defendant made and defaulted
on a final purchase. Plaintiff sued in replevin for possession of all
of the items defendant ever purchased. Defendant claimed the
contract was unconscionable by reason of past cases 59 and a re-
cently enacted statute of limited relevancy." The court reversed
and remanded the case on the grounds of the possible uncon-
55. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
56. Actually, the case on appeal joined two lower court cases with a common plaintiff
but with unrelated defendants. This Article disregards the other joined case.
57. 350 F.2d at 447.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 448. The cases cited were from other jurisdictions. Even Scott v. United
States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443 (1870), although a United States Supreme Court case, was
not binding on the federal circuits. The reliance on these cases was largely due to relevant
case authority within the jurisdiction rejecting unconscionability as a defense in a liqui-
dated damages contract case. See, e.g, District of Columbia v. Harlan & Hollingsworth
Co., 30 App. D.C. 270 (1908).
60. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-302 (Supp. IV 1965), amended by D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28:2-302 (1981). The District of Columbia enacted this version of § 2-302 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code after the parties had entered into the instant contract. The section
provides that a court may refuse to enforce a contract which was unconscionable at the
time it was made. Id.
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scionability of the contract, 6' in large part because of the defend-
ant's weak bargaining position due to economic duress which gave
him no real choice but to sign an unfair contract. Further, uncon-
scionability was a concern relevant to the court and a factor which
the lower court could use to overturn otherwise valid contracts,
but one which it failed to exercise.
The main disagreement between the majority and the dissent
concerned competing conceptions of judicial role and the exact
place of legal forms in constructing that role.62 The dissent
thought that looking to legal forms provides a more or less com-
plete description of judicial role, at least in terms of how a judge
ought to proceed.63 They did not argue that the contract was fair
or that general considerations of public policy did not suggest that
there was duress in the bargaining situation. Further and more
basically, they did not argue that the majority disregarded prece-
dent, ignored statutes, or abused any legal form. The dissent did
argue, though not in these terms, that it was not part of the judge's
task to assess fairness in agreements, or more generally, that
judges may not look outside legal forms for criteria to make
decisions.'
The majority presented a slightly more complicated argument.
At first glance, it also appears to hold that a judge may not go
beyond legal forms when reaching a decision. The court states
that no controlling authority exists on the points raised in the case
and thus, the congressional adoption of section 2-302 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code becomes "persuasive authority for follow-
ing the rationale of the cases from which the section is explicitly
derived."65 This argument is untenable. Its difficulties are many.
First, subsequent statutes are generally considered irrelevant to
the resolution of cases arising prior to their enactment, especially
in contract matters where reliance of the parties is a major con-
cern. Second, statutes are more often taken as changing case law,
which suggests that the legislature believed that the case law did
not remedy unconscionable contracts. Third, relevant precedents
existed which favored the plaintiff. Four hundred years of con-
61. 350 F.2d at 449.
62. A secondary disagreement involved the lower court's failure to find unconsciona-
bility. The dissent recognized that failure as an indication of a finding of conscionability.
Id. at 450. The majority believed it made no finding on the issue, one way or the other. Id.
We shall assume for the purposes of this discussion that the majority is correct.
63. Id. at 450-51.
64. Id. at 450.
65. Id. at 449.
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tract law suggest that courts should enforce bargains, unless they
are illegal, formally faulty, or subject to some recognized excusing
defense. Despite a plethora of case citations and discussion of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the court simply argued that the con-
tract was in fact unfair.66 It was apparently self-evident to the
court that if a contract was unfair it could not be enforced. The
cases and the Code agreed with this conclusion. Yet, according to
the opinion, neither formed the basis of the decision.67 Legal
forms were significant here because they evidenced a fairness
principle. Their consideration in looking to role was derivative.
The court recognized that its perception of the proper conception
of judicial role might be a minority view and thus recommended
that Congress codify the decision.68 Nevertheless, the holding
demonstrated that the court's own position on judicial role obvi-
ously did not require codification to allow a conscionability test in
any case involving a challenged contract.
The Williams case suggests how the popular picture of legal
forms can be misleading. The dissent is not merely arguing within
the context of legal forms, it is implicitly arguing for their pri-
macy. The majority is either arguing for forms to be one consid-
eration among many or that forms serve a token primacy, but one
which should not obscure the extent to which they are only one
factor among several. If the popular picture suggests that courts
can always or ever reach a judicial decision solely by resorting to
legal forms, it misleads by failing to state that how one considers
legal forms depends upon one's view of role. Depending on the
answers to the prior questions of role, solutions suggested by legal
forms may be more or less relevant or important. This is why, for
example, a computer could not solve cases satisfactorily even if its
memory bank included a thorough knowledge of legal forms.
Judges hold competing positions about the place of legal forms
and no single analogue would duplicate the varieties of judicial
behavior.69
Williams does illustrate how, even when controversy exists
66. Id. at 450.
67. Id. at 449.
68. Id. at 448.
69. This is not to say that a computer could not do as good a job, vis-a-vis legal forms,
as any particular judge. The assertion merely suggests that no single program could dupli-
cate the workings of ajudicial system, even in the matter of narrow legal questions. Never-
theless, in stating that a computer could not duplicate a judicial system, one should not
imply that it necessarily would always operate more poorly or achieve less satisfactory
results.
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over the definitional occurrence, the resolution occurrence can be
straightforward. The entire court agreed on how, given certain
assumptions about role, one would reach a decision. The profes-
sional education of the bench and the bar focuses primarily on the
study and employment of legal forms. Once forms are considered
relevant, debate about their workings is extremely narrow. The
popular picture is a simple one, and this shared universe of knowl-
edge allows the simplicity to remain and yet be accurate. When
conflicts come before courts, the modus operandi is apparent and
consistent. Both the majority and the dissent in Williams looked
to cases and statutes and found almost the same thing. Although
their procedure was almost identical, their use of procedure
differed.
A brief word might be helpful in ascertaining the meaning of
the statement that legal forms contain propositions but are not
themselves part of the chain of judicial reasoning. One identifies
legal forms by their pedigree.7" They are public objects generally
taken as having a special relevance to judicial decisionmaking.
This relevance results partially because of their authority as stan-
dards for decision and also because of their pedigree, as these
were intended uses. This does not mean that the forms' authors'
actual or imputed intentions toward legal forms are reasons for
attributing authority to those forms-a quite unsupportable asser-
tion. Rather, one can believe that the forms' authors realized that
practitioners would take their work as authority and produced
them with that realization in mind. The reader manufactures the
intention which makes no pretense of being identical to the actual
intentions of the authors. Statutes, published cases, and constitu-
tions may be intended as authority for future decisions. Customs
rarely carry this intention, but practitioners and judges read or
gloss an intention into each legal form. Thus, the propositions
that one can extract from legal forms have an immediate rele-
vance to making a judicial decision, but they are only important
when employed propositionally. The legal realists recognized this
and said that forms are not law but evidence of law. A clearer
interpretation is that forms are not law but one can use their pro-
positional contents as law, depending on one's judicial view.
70. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17 (1977). According to Dworkin,
pedigree refers to the manner of adoption or development of such forms (or in other con-
texts, rules).
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III. REASONING BY ANALOGY
Judicial reasoning is often thought to be primarily reasoning
by analogy. That is, at least in the case of the common law, one
expects a judge to look to specific previous decisions to decide a
specific instant case. A movement from the general to the specific
is deductive reasoning, from the specific to the general is induc-
tive, and from the specific to the specific is reasoning by analogy.7'
The movement from specific to specific often involves making
a generalization after analyzing the first case, and that generaliza-
tion forms the basis for deciding the next case. It thus resembles
an induction followed by a deduction. One observer character-
ized it as
a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in
which a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a
rule of law then applied to a next similar situation. The steps
are these: similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law
inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is
made applicable to the second case.72
Nevertheless, one should consider analogy as a separate kind of
reasoning from induction because it characterizes those cases
where there is no already established rule as provided by induc-
tion. Thus, it is necessary to look to a specific case to generate a
rule. In reasoning by analogy one can impeach the second case if
the first case is faulty, while in the case of induction followed by a
deduction, normally one only attacks as far back as the rule. An
attack on a specific application of that rule is not fully sufficient to
impeach the rule but only weakens its scope or creates an
exception.
It is important to understand clearly that induction is not the
logic of the law. Essential to any inductive logic is a method of
testing the correctness of hypotheses or putative conclusions.
Thus, planetary behavior could disconfirm an astronomical hy-
pothesis, a native speaker could inform a language learner of mis-
use of a concept, or weather could determine the accuracy of a
theory of meteorological forecasting.73 Predicting right answers
71. Strictly speaking, this is not the way the terms would appear to a logician, but it is
the way lawyers would probably define them. Some lawyers do not speak of analogous
reasoning but see statutes as involving deductive reasoning and cases as involving inductive
reasoning. The terminology is erratic in much of the literature and one can think of this
section as applying to reasoning from case to case, rather than pertaining to reasoning
under a certain tagged category.
72. E. LEVi, supra note 14, at 1-2.
73. Whether one can confirm or disconfirm any hypothesis or theory is a philosophy
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CONCEPT OF THE JUDICIAL DECISION
or results becomes the focus of any inductive logic, both method-
ologically and for purposes of establishing its soundness. If the
criteria for being right are unavailable, such a logic amounts to no
more than random guesses.7 4 Given that testing is not a method
of judging the appropriateness (truth, correctness, verisimilitude)
of judicial assertions, such a fact at least would suggest that one
cannot regard induction in any ordinary sense as logic.
In this final section, this Article argues that reasoning by anal-
ogy is not a distinct matter from reasoning by deduction. 75 In-
stead, analogy is a method of proceeding when certain premises in
a deductive argument are hidden or obscure. When one employs
a truly nondeductive method, it is more aptly called argument by
metaphor than argument by analogy.
Contrasting this view with the one presented by Joseph Raz in
The Authority of Law76 can best illustrate these points. Raz begins
by suggesting that a court can be in two positions, one where a
statute or a ratio is binding, and one where it is not.77 Only in the
latter case does reasoning by analogy come into play. According
to Raz, "A court relies on analogy whenever it draws on similari-
ties or dissimilarities between the present case and previous cases
which are not binding precedents applying to the present case."7 8
Thus, in cases where a court is not bound it uses analogy, which
allows it to discover new rules.79 These new rules are not binding;
of science question that is irrelevant here. The method of confirmation typifies inductive
reasoning regardless of the difficulties of empiricism, verificationism, or theory formation.
The point is that that method, whatever form it takes and whatever general value it pos-
sesses, is not descriptive of judicial reasoning. For a discussion of certain difficulties in
constructing a method of confirming inductive hypotheses, see R. CHISHOLM, PERCEIVING
(1957).
74. Predicting judicial results fails on two well-known accounts. Prediction would not
help judges reach decisions because even if one believed that judges predict what other
judges do, one would engage either in circular thinking or in a search for some objective
psychological standard of correctness. More basically, judicial reasoning has a normative
component, with court results capable of fallibility. Absent this, the bench and the bar
could not accomplish their routine tasks, i.e., discuss and assess whether decisions are cor-
rectly decided.
75. Deduction here denotes a standard zero and a first order logic that allows for
implication and equivalence.
76. J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 201-09 (1979).
77. Id. at 85, 90-97, 102, 111-15 (discussing the division of cases into two categories,
those where the judge can exercise discretion and those where the judge is bound).
78. Id. at 202.
79. Id. at 202, 204-05. Raz explains that argument by analogy "is not a method of
discovering which rules are legally binding because of the doctrine of precedent; [rather, it
is] a form of justification of new rules laid down by the courts in the exercise of their
lawmaking discretion." Id. at 202.
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however, they are persuasive. Raz sees this position as a compro-
mise between that held by Ronald Dworkin, whom he character-
izes as holding that analogies are binding,8" and that held by those
who "have concluded that analogical argument is mere window-
dressing, a form of argument without legal or other force resorted
to for cosmetic reasons.""' Analogies for Raz "are always morally
relevant. . . . [But] there is no point in saying judges are legally
obliged to use analogical arguments."8 2  He sees analogies as a
reforming aspect of adjudication, one where new ideas, brought in
as new rules via old cases, are used differently.83
Raz sees the actual procedure of applying analogy as this: One
looks at the series of relevant features the instant case possesses,
then looks at a past case sharing some but not all of these features,
somehow sees that past case as relevant, and finally borrows the
conclusion of the past decision and uses it in the instant case.8 4
The major difficulty with Raz's position is that it seems to con-
80. Id. at 205 & n.19. It might appear at first glance that the position taken here is the
same as the one held by Dworkin. There are however, two important differences. First,
Dworkin believes that the third order is objective and thus analogy will not only reveal a
commitment but a truth. "Third order" is the term Raz uses to describe the group of legal
rules which include beliefs about legal rules. See infra note 83. Second, Dworkin believes
that the analogical process is itself an objective matter, rather than one where different but
equally valid positions are available. See R. DwoRKIN, supra note 70, at 81.
81. J. RAZ, supra note 76, at 205.
82. Id. at 206 (morally relevant in the sense that such arguments "should be assigned
the weight which it is morally right to give them") (emphasis in original).
83. The existence of a hierarchy in which legal rules occupy "levels of order" provides
an explanation of the ability of analogy to spawn reform. One can think of legal rules in
holdings as usually being lower or first order. Those statements governing first order rules,
rules about rules, are second order. One can continue up the order ladder if a situation
warrants. Orders are populated according to applications. A higher order rule in one case
might be first order in another. Let us consider a nonlegal, nonnormative example. Direc-
tories may list business services. A second order directory may list the names of directories
which list services. A second order directory might list Yellow Pages, Better Business Bu-
reau members, or Chamber of Commerce members.
One constructs a reasoning chain to see how a particular rule functions in a particular
instance. Suppose one wants to know how many witnesses are necessary to validate a
written will in a particular jurisdiction. Suppose that the answer is two. Thus, the state-
ment that "two witnesses are necessary to validate a will" is a first order proposition.
"State statute governs how many witnesses are necessary to validate a will" is a second
order proposition. It provides a reason for asserting the lower order proposition. In the
same way, "statutes are good authority for legal propositions" could be a third order prop-
osition. One can easily attain greater precision, but the intuitive idea necessary to under-
stand the arguments in this Article should be clear. Propositions are placed in orders or
levels according to how the chain of reasoning (schema) works, not according to any simple
definiton of membership. Moreover, beliefs about legal rules generally will be placed in
the third order.
84. J. RAZ, supra note 76, at 202-03.
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fuse cases with propositions or, using his own terminology, rules.
Raz appears committed to the view of a past case as binding au-
thority for only one thing, and that thing is intimately connected
with the factual background of the specific case. Let us imagine a
case, case F, where, for the first time, a defendant raises the tort
defense of self-defense in a civil suit for assault and battery. Past
cases allowed self-defense as a defense in criminal cases, but F is a
case of first impression. According to Raz, a judge is under no
obligation to consider the criminal cases; if he did, he would be
engaging in a moral activity.
This Article suggests earlier that interpreting the ratio
decidendi of a case is a matter that can vary according to one's
judicial view.85 Certainly, one can imagine judicial views where
reasons provided in one context are always considered relevant, if
not determinative, in others. Under these views, there would be
no "new rules" (as Raz calls them) but merely the discovered im-
plications of existing propositions. However, even under a judi-
cial view with a narrower notion of intercontextual relevancy, one
needs to consider the premises of any argument as part of the ratio
according to the rule of logical implication. One element in the
criminal propositional set would necessarily specify the scope of
the criminal self-defense claim and would offer a higher order rea-
son that justifies that claim. Cases can state or imply reasons such
as discouraging violence, allowing for just deserts for assailants,
protecting potential third-party innocent victims, providing a cost-
efficient method of imposing punishment on those who should be
punished, and allowing for the spending of the retributive inclina-
tions of a society in a fruitful and limited manner. Raz would
argue that higher order reasons always are nonobligatory in the
related civil cases because of the disparity in factual context.
Let us consider a second case of first impression, case N, that
involves prosecution of a wife for criminally assaulting her hus-
band. The wife claims self-defense. N would be the first instance
of the use of self-defense within a marriage. One must remember
that marriage is a legal relationship that allows certain kinds of
contracts between persons which are sometimes impermissible
outside that relationship.
Raz at this point has a choice: he may claim either that a new
rule is needed to decide F but not N or that new rules are needed
85. See supra notes 28-45 and text accompanying note 45.
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to decide both F and N.16 If he chooses the first option, he must
distinguish F from N. He certainly cannot say that N shares more
features with the traditional self-defense case than F does, because
they each share all relevant features but one-a lack of criminal
proceedings versus a lack of nonmarital proceedings. In fact,
given the complications that one could imagine, it is difficult to
know how to measure the similarity of factual situations. More-
over, it is not clear why greater similarity alone is a reason for
allowing precedent to govern N and applying analogy to F.
Raz could say that the difference between N and the tradi-
tional cases is not significant. The circumstances of marriage
should not make a difference in an assault and self-defense case.
That is, the reasons for allowing self-defense in normal circum-
stances also apply to N. Raz, however, cannot distinguish N from
F on these grounds. The reasons for allowing self-defense in F
might be compelling and they are certainly likely to be the same
reasons found in criminal cases. Looking at reasons rather than
facts logically requires a court to apply reasons from analogous
cases to determine the result, even in new factual situations. Raz
seems to reject this position.
One might believe that N is obviously distinguishable from F
because the "old rule" that one can protect oneself from deadly
assault applies only to N and not F. However, assuming that past
decisions enunciated this formulation of the rule, it covers both N
and F. Of course, one can formulate the rule in such a way as to
exclude F, but this Article does not use, ex hypothesi, this formu-
lation. One can assume a broad formulation of the rule where
subsequent exceptions have been previously introduced. In other
words, one can assume what often occurs-courts, not overly
careful about the possibility of future difficult cases, leave the de-
termination of those cases and the reformulation of the rule to a
future court.
Raz's other option is to say that a new rule is necessary in both
F and N. The obvious difficulty with this position is that if one
can freely decide case N as one sees fit, then when must one de-
cide cases in accordance with old rules? Each case presents a
unique factual situation. For a rule to be useful, it must cover
diverse cases with common features. Specifying in advance which
86. Raz actually makes a third type of objection. He claims that the kind of position
taken here is indistinguishable from (or collapses into) Ronald Dworkin's position and is
thus defective for the same reasons that he criticized Dworkin's position. See supra note 80
and accompanying text.
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cases a rule covers involves understanding the reasons why one
applies a given rule. These higher order reasons compel the use of
the given rule when no rational differences exist between the in-
stant situation and the type of situation that the rule was meant to
cover. This is just the type of situation, however, that Raz claims
analogy covers. If one does not apply the rule, an irrationality
exists in the rule system; if it is applied, the instant case is not one
outside the purview of existing propositions.
One might object that the categories of criminal and civil are
so basic, that whatever difficulty might surround delineating the
scope of specific rules, the criminal/civil distinction is easy to
trace throughout the case law. Given this fact, one could see how
to distinguish F from N. Such a distinction ignores the numerous
intermediate cases between criminal and tort categories that in-
cludes cases in tort with punitive damages, criminal proceedings
where the defendant must pay restitution to the victim, and de-
claratory judgment actions where plaintiff asks for advice on some
contemplated action that may eventually sound in either tort or
criminal law.
Raz schematically tries to show when an argument from anal-
ogy holds.87 Let us assume two cases, case 1 and case 2.88 Each
has facts shown by lower case letters, implications of facts shown
by upper case letters. Raz uses for analogy the precedent case 1:
a, b, c, d, e, g/A , B, C---X (which means A, B, C yield the hold-
ing X), and the instant case 2: a 2, b 2, c 2 (i.e., not c2), d 2, e2 /A, B,
D->? Raz says that we knowA, B, C-> X, but we do not know if
A, B->X orA, B, D--*X. If one introduces case 1 as an analogy, it
is for the proposition that A, B->X, which would solve case 2.
The problem is that long before one needs to settle case 2, it is
appropriate to ask what is meant by case 1 yielding X. Suppose
the issue in case 1 is whether a contract exists. We see consent
(mutual assent), consideration, and an exchange of promises, that
is,.A, B, and C. The specific facts would be at least a set: a, b, c,
d, e, and g. What does the case stand for? It certainly does stand
for.A, B, C->X where X means the contract is valid, but it strictly
applies only where there is exactlyA, B, and C. Suppose a is the
fact that Smith consented and A denotes consent. If A is a broad
concept of legal consent-freely entered into with certain kinds of
87. See J. RAz, supra note 76, at 180-89 (where he sets out his schema), 201-06 (where
he applies it to analogies).
88. For purposes of clarity, this Article uses the designations case I and case 2, instead
of Raz's symbols, P and Q.
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knowledge of the bargain, etc.-then a does not imply A. No a
can be that complex.8 9 Here A's meaning will derive from pro-
positions outside the facts of the case. In order to work out the
logic of A, an investigation of the criteria that yield its parameters
is eventually necessary. When case 2 arises, perhaps a consent
case where duress is more explicitly at issue, the scope of A will be
determined for both case 1 and case 2. But one's commitment to
case 1 also serves as a commitment to a certain line on case 2. On
the other hand, if a->A, then each case stands only for its facts.
This seems to make each case unique and to yield a degenerate
notion of implication in case law.
The problem with Raz's explanation of analogy largely lies
with its allowing for exactly two kinds of cases, those where past
decisions bind the court and those where they do not. One is
bound, however, by reasons rather than decisional judgments.
This process begins with the construction of a multilevel proposi-
tional schema where one has a commitment to the implication of
one's judicial view. This means that a number of conclusions can
be generated, each of which is binding, that are not normally asso-
ciated with the holdings of past decisions. For example, suppose
that in reaching a judgment in a property case, one needs to hold
that "if p then q." Regardless of the general relevancy of that
property case in a subsequent commercial paper case, if one is
committed top, one is also committed to q. If a judge is to have a
rational judicial view, one can envision him looking to other cases
to investigate the nature of his commitments. In that sense, one
can state that analogies intrude rather than entice.90
One should note that this is not Professor Ronald Dworkin's
view.91 Because judicial views are partly a matter of choice, no
analogue exists for settling disputes among those with different
views. Thus analogy, as it is part of the process that begins with
higher order propositions, is not uniform. It seeks internal consis-
89. A partial difficulty is that Raz's use of the stroke function ("/") is deviant and the
reader is left to ponder just what he might intend.
90. This position is at odds with John Wisdom's well-known analysis of analogies.
Wisdom, Gods, I LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 187, 195-96 (A. Flew ed. 1951). Wisdom claims
that the process of reasoning by analogy does not involve a chain of reasoning. "The rea-
sons are like the legs of a chair, not the links of a chain." Id. at 195. But if one reaches for
an analogy and that analogy fails, a critical support for one's argument is missing. This can
result in more than a tipsy chair, it can result in a failed argument. This Article does not
contest Wisdom's argument that analogical discussion is a priori and not a matter of
probabilities (a matter of experience).
91. See supra note 80 and accompanying text, for a discussion of Dworkin's view.
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tency, but allows for change even in the higher order propositional
set as consequences are revealed. Thus, in Raz's terms, it is re-
formative rather than conservative, a label he applies to Dwor-
kin's theory.92
Raz might object that he could admit everything said, but still
be able to say that certain cases involve neither deduction nor a
search for hidden premises and deduction from discovered prem-
ises. These other cases employ a method whereby a rule from one
case is applied to another case, even though it does not strictly
apply. These cases sometimes use a method labeled "legal
fictions."93 In other cases, the new rule is such an obvious change
from the old rule that the court employs a different tag, as in cases
of tacit consent or constructive eviction. The cases, though, share
the feature of holding some proposition that the judges know is
not strictly true. Therefore, they use metaphor, a rhetorical de-
vice, to transpose a term from its original concept. Metaphor al-
lows the transposition even when there is no preservation of truth.
"All the world's a stage" may be evocative, interesting, poetic, and
perceptive, but unless one changes the meanings of certain terms it
is false. The metaphor as a linguistic device is inoffensive to a
concept of truth; it allows for the deviant predication of names
without evoking literal truth. To say, within a system such as the
common law, that metaphor compels a result is not only logically
and methodically untrue but wrong, because the suggested result
is the wrong result under the existing principles of the system.
Metaphor suggests future reform or perhaps that it is time to re-
consider one's judicial view.
The above interpretation provides the best analysis of Raz's
sole example of a case that reasons by analogy. In D v. National
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children," an action for
negligence against the National Society for Prevention of Cruelty
to Children (NSPCC), the House of Lords' holding allowed de-
92. J. RA:z, supra note 76, at 205 & n.19.
93. Scholars often criticize legal fictions unfairly. Jeremy Bentham's famous remarks
on legal fictions are not atypical: "Fiction of use to justice? Exactly as swindling is to
trade. . . . It affords presumptive and conclusive evidence of moral turpitude in those by
whom it was invented and first employed." J. BENTHAM, Constitutional Code, in 9 JEREMY
BENTHAM'S WORKs 77 (J. Bowring ed..1843). Fictions merely allow an alteration of the
propositional set. Even in a Benthamite utilitarian analysis, if the positive effect of the
change is greater than the negative effects of the disruption and slight ruse, one can say that
fictions are useful. For our purposes, one can view fictions as just another form ofjudicial
metaphor.
94. [1977] 1 All E.R. 589 (H.L.), cited in J. P_&z, supra note 76, at 203.
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fendant to hide the identity of one of its informants, even though
that identity was relevant to the case.95 Existing rules seemed
flatly to compel the NSPCC to reveal its source.96 However, a
rule (or proposition) allowed government agencies to keep similar
information secret if revealing it would be contrary to the public
interest or the efficient function of government. 97 The Lords held
that in cases where the NSPCC serves a public function, it is enti-
tled to the protections of privilege afforded to government
agencies. 98
It seems unlikely that a desire for propositional consistency
motivated the Lords' holding, as no instances of a separation be-
tween an agency's governmental aspect and its public function as-
pect previously had arisen.99 If one supposes, however, that courts
granted the privilege to government agencies because they serve a
public function," ° this does not help Raz. This supposition would
make the case one of deduction, where a judge should be bound to
view the NSPCC as having the privilege.
Normally, private agencies do not enjoy the privilege.' 10 For
Raz to claim that one can freely choose whether or not to grant
the privilege to the NSPCC, he must consider prior cases with-
holding the privilege from private agencies as a matter of course
(usually, no doubt, without discussion) as not endorsing the rule
they seemed to use. Ruling for the NSPCC not only expanded the
rule of privilege for those meeting the revised test, it reduced the
scope of the rule that allows for the discovery of information in
normal circumstances. If later courts can cut back rules, when are
they ever binding? If one can articulate reasons for reading in
exceptions later, then, in fact, the distinction upon which Raz ba-
ses his argument, between binding and. nonbinding situations,
falls apart.
A more reasonable explanation of D v. National Societyfor the
Prevention of Cruelly to Children involves seeing the case as an
instance of metaphor. Metaphor allows one to alter propositional
sets (in Raz's terms, existing or old rules) not merely by adding
new propositions, but by changing unsatisfactory old ones. In the
95. 1 All E.R. at 589-90.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 590.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 600 (opinion of Lord Hailsham).
100. Id. at 590.
101. Id.
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instant case, the House of Lords separated the factor of "public
function" from its governmental usage home. The two were no
longer synonymous. Thus, certain cases that were previously
outside the purview of governmental rules can be brought in with-
out destroying the concept of "governmental" or the content of a
large quantity of previous case law. The great utility of both met-
aphor and deduction masked as analogy is that they allow judicial
growth and refinement without offending notions of consistency,
justice, disinterestedness, or fairness.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the authority of the common law is to remain vigorous, one
must not misunderstand the characteristics of its logic. The pro-
cess of adjudication is complex and vague, but necessarily so, for
it reflects the complex and vague beliefs and attitudes of those
officials, litigants, and members of the public who shape it and are
ruled by it. Perhaps greater care in framing arguments and ana-
lyzing precedent will not only aid the achievement of clarity in
adjudication, but the alleviation of injustice.
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